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Introduction 
 
The concept of animal spirits has been given renewed attention recently, notably 
by Akerlof and Shiller (2009), after decades of relative absence from the 
economics literature. It is a phrase which has also been used in non-academic 
discussions about behaviour leading up to the current financial crisis, and 
behaviour in the wake of the crisis. The concept has a long history in physiology, 
going back to the ancient Greeks, within discussions about the relationships 
between mind, body and world.1 Such discussions are also now current in the 
fields of philosophy, psychology and neuroscience, with echoes too in the 
neuroeconomics literature. Since animal spirits is thus related to important 
currents in economics, we aim to consider it here in relation to economics and 
economic policy. 
 ‘Animal spirits’ is a potent expression which, like most potent 
expressions, eludes simple definition. This is a virtue insofar as it fosters 
communication even where there are different shades of meaning (Davis 1999). 
But it impedes communication if fundamental differences in meaning are not 
recognised. In what follows we aim to show how different methodological 
frameworks produce such differences in meaning. Since we argue that animal 
spirits is a concept whose policy significance depends on its meaning, it is 
important to explore these differences. 
   By the 1980s mainstream macroeconomic theory had virtually eliminated 
any reference to the concept of animal spirits because of its classification as 
irrationality. In 1985 we published an analysis of animal spirits as the concept had 
been used by Keynes in the General Theory, and referring back to the Treatise on 
Probability which laid the philosophical foundations for Keynes’s use of the 
concept. There we argued that animal spirits were a critical element of a 
framework for decision making under uncertainty which was rational in a broader 
sense, an argument by which we continue to stand. The purpose in revisiting the 
concept here is first, given the revival of interest in the concept, to review the 
differences in meaning attached to animal spirits in the modern mainstream 
literature. We then continue with the meaning particular to a Keynesian 
framework, which involves animal spirits as part of a process of broadly rational 
decision-making, an approach adopted most recently by Frydman and Goldberg 
(2011) in their analysis of behaviour in financial markets.  
 We then attempt to take forward the use of the animal spirits concept, 
building on our 1985 analysis and drawing on the work of others who have built 
further on Keynes’s analysis. This work helps us to understand animal spirits in 
                                                 
1 See Matthews (1984), Koppl (1991), Moggridge (1992) and Barens (2011) for discussions of the 
origins of the expression. 
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 terms of current discussions of the relations between cognition and sentiment. Our 
particular contribution then is to develop further the idea of animal spirits as 
something which varies according to context, both over time and between 
different groups according to their different experience. This is to understand 
animal spirits not as mere caprice but rather as something embedded in decision 
making, varying according to context: different groupings in the economy, 
different institutional arrangements and different conjunctures. While animal 
spirits perform a central and enduring role within a capitalist system, there is 
scope for animal spirits to vary with economic structure and with economic and 
political ‘atmosphere’. By showing that animal spirits can be part of an analysis of 
behaviour, we show that policy can fruitfully take analysis of animal spirits on 
board.  
 The policy relevance of analysis of animal spirits, in addressing current 
structure and atmosphere, depends on the extent to which such analysis is 
feasible. Much depends on whether animal spirits can only be thought of as 
autonomous (and possibly random), so that we can only analyse their 
consequences; there is no basis for designing policy to modify them. If instead 
there is scope for developing an analysis of animal spirits themselves and the way 
in which they fit into the determination of behaviour, then there is scope for 
government to address their role in their policy-making in an active, rather than 
reactive, way. While there is scope for extending the analysis to household 
consumption (particularly discretionary consumption and consumption on 
consumer durables), we focus on the scope for extending the analysis from the 
real production sector to the financial sector. 
 
Animal Spirits: Different Meanings in Modern Use 
 
The term ‘animal spirits’ was recently drawn to wide attention in economics by 
the publication in 2009 of George Akerlof and Robert Shiller’s book of that title, 
the first economics book solely devoted to the concept. The context in which they 
approached the concept was the new behavioural economics, which uses 
psychological theory and neuroscience to help economists understand actual 
behaviour observed in experimental situations.2 In particular the concern is to 
understand and predict behaviour which appears to challenge the predictions of 
models built on the axioms of rational individual behaviour.  
 However, their analysis retains the language of that deductive axiomatic 
framework, such that they classify what is being studied as ‘noneconomic motives 
and irrational behaviors’ (Akerlof and Shiller 2009: x). While they don’t pursue 
                                                 
2 The term ‘new behavioural economics’ is used here to distinguish it from the ‘old behavioural 
economics’ a distinction explained by Sent (2004). 
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 the meaning of this classification itself, it seems that the distinction between 
rationality and irrationality (as well as between economic and noneconomic) is 
embedded in the axiomatic framework which they are challenging.3 Indeed the 
rationality/irrationality dual had provided the traditional distinction between 
subject matter of economics and psychology respectively, such that irrationality 
was not seen as something economists might discuss. But psychology has moved 
on in developing theories of emotion for example, while neuroscience now 
addresses the interactions between physiology, cognition and emotion. But, while 
new behavioural economics is being drawn into this territory by the Akerlof and 
Shiller volume, we shall see below the signifance of retaining the traditional 
rationality/irrationality distinction.  
 Mainstream economics has the potential to develop significantly with 
Akerlof and Shiller, exploring beyond traditional boundaries. They demonstrate 
the importance of understanding the economic role of each of the forms of animal 
spirits which they identify; the subtitle of the volume is after all How Human 
Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why it Matters for Global Capitalism. 
While they refer to Keynes’s (1936) use of the term ‘animal spirits’, Akerlof and 
Shiller go way beyond his application of the concept to the entrepreneur’s 
motivation to invest in real capital. Instead they apply animal spirits to knowledge 
more widely: to confidence, to money illusion and to the way in which knowledge 
is constructed within stories. But they also apply it to ‘noneconomic’ ethical 
preferences with respect to fairness on the one hand and corruption and anti-social 
behaviour on the other. Since none of this accords with the standard rationality 
framework it is all classed as irrational. The analysis of irrationality is taken 
forward by differentiating between these various aspects. Further, although animal 
spirits for Akerlof and Shiller are ‘restless … thought patterns’ (pages 1, 4) which 
promote instability, the overall discussion treats them as something other than a 
stochastic phenomenon. However Nuti (2009) notes that the emphasis is on the 
effects of each aspect of ‘irrationality’ rather than an explanation of its source.  
 This identification of animal spirits with ‘black box’ irrationality has been 
a central feature of the way in which the concept has been used in the mainstream 
literature since Keynes. In the neo-classical synthesis period, animal spirits lay 
behind the critical exogeneity of the investment demand function, although the 
term itself fell into disuse. In turn, with the advent of New Classical economics, 
the concept of irrationality itself fell into disuse. But then it was revived by New 
Keynesian attempts to develop an alternative to real business cycle theory. A large 
literature has now developed which explains economic fluctuations in terms of 
animal spirits. These were understood initially as (irrational) expectations which 
were self-fulfilling (see Azariadis 1981, Shleifer 1986 and Howitt and McAfee 
                                                 
3 Indeed they refer throughout to ‘economists’ as those who employ this framework (see e.g. page 
12), without reference to other approaches to economics. 
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 1992). The meaning of animal spirits was generalised as a random shock to 
‘beliefs’, which could explain economic fluctuations (Farmer 2010).  But, since it 
had been argued that, within the theory, animal spirits could in fact be substituted 
by sunspots, it was clear that the essence of the argument was that any stochastic 
exogenous variable could generate fluctuations (Woodford 1991, Farmer and Guo 
1994).4 By implication, since this variable was unexplained, and if irrational 
behaviour were inexplicable, there was little scope for policy to address it, other 
than dealing with its consequences. 
 In this literature, as in Akerlof and Shiller, Keynes’s animal spirits are a 
starting-point.5 Farmer for example reflects the spirit of Keynes’s theory of 
knowledge by his use of the concept of belief. Further, reference is sometimes 
also made to Keynes’s (1936: 156) quite different beauty contest metaphor to 
explain self-fulfilling expectations in financial markets. Since these expectations 
are assumed to arise randomly, they take the same form as animal spirits, which 
are also assumed to be random. The end result in this literature is therefore much 
more constrained than in the Akerlof and Shiller volume because of the insistence 
on formalisation in terms of stochastic models within the rationality framework. 
While Akerlof and Shiller concentrate on the territory outside that framework, the 
New Keynesian literature ends up, quite logically, giving the name of animal 
spirits to a stochastic exogenous variable whose source is beyond exploration. 
What is on offer therefore is either a very broad understanding of animal spirits 
which potentially refers to anything outside the formal rationality framework or a 
narrow understanding of it in terms of its formal specification as a stochastic 
variable. 
 Ultimately it is puzzling that Akerlof and Shiller should adopt the 
language of the deductivist framework, creating an apparent bifurcation between 
that framework and their own, quite different, framework as if what they have to 
say falls outside economics. While they appear to be challenging the mainstream 
account, they do not challenge the core concept of rationality itself. A critique of 
this mainstream framework is at the heart of Frydman and Goldberg’s (2011) 
argument about the inadequacies of theory based on the rationality principle, with 
its presumption of certainty or certainty-equivalence. They point out that this 
approach to economic theory can only depict markets as being mechanical, where 
‘nothing new ever happens’. Yet capitalist economies are essentially creative and 
on that account prone to quite normal fluctuations and to the general uncertainty 
of knowledge; there is no good reason to expect these fluctuations to arise 
randomly. Bhidé (2011) makes a closely-related argument with respect to 
                                                 
4 See Davidson’s (2007: 111-2) critique of sunspot theory in rational expectations models. 
5 Herbert Simon’s bounded rationality is the starting-point for the literature which explains animal 
spirits as biased belief due to cognitive limitations (see e.g. de Grauwe 2010, who posits bias as 
unexplained ‘optimism’ or ‘pessimism’). 
4
Submission to Capitalism and Society
http://www.bepress.com/cas
 mainstream finance theory and the need for judgement given the shortcomings of 
the mainstream understanding of rationality. 
 Akerlof and Shiller’s choice of terminology may have been designed to 
communicate to the mainstream that their analysis lies outside the strict rationality 
framework. But by classifying their area of study as irrationality they perpetuate 
that framework, whereas different frameworks would allow for different 
conceptualisations. Indeed there is a range of frameworks outside the mainstream 
which understand rationality in a different way from the mainstream.6 In order to 
explore further the meaning of animal spirits within one such alternative 
framework, we go back to Keynes again and consider how the Post Keynesian 
literature has built on his use of the concept of animal spirits within a theory of 
rational belief.  
 
A Post Keynesian View 
 
In order to understand the modern Post Keynesian account of animal spirits it is 
useful to start by considering what Keynes seems to have meant by the term. He 
uses the term only three times, in pages 161-2 of chapter 12 of The General 
Theory which deals with the decision by entrepreneurs to invest in real capital:    
 
Most, probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full 
consequences of which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only 
be taken as a result of animal spirits — of a spontaneous urge to action rather 
than inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative 
benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities. … Thus if the animal spirits 
are dimmed and the spontaneous optimism falters, leaving us to depend on 
nothing but a mathematical expectation, enterprise will fade and die;— though 
fears of loss may have a basis no more reasonable than hopes of profit had 
before. … But individual initiative will only be adequate when reasonable 
calculation is supplemented and supported by animal spirits, so that the 
thought of ultimate loss which often overtakes pioneers, as experience 
undoubtedly tells us and them, is put aside as a healthy man puts aside the 
expectation of death.  
 
Animal spirits therefore refer to an innate capacity or instinct or disposition of the 
entrepreneurs who characterised ‘old-fashioned capitalism’. These are 
‘individuals of sanguine temperament and constructive impulses who embarked 
                                                 
6 These alternative frameworks also tend to understand economics as a moral science, where 
values are necessarily embedded in any framework, including the mainstream framework. 
Discussions of fairness and anti-social behaviour therefore, far from being noneconomic, make 
sense within these alternative approaches to economics. But that is not our primary concern here. 
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 on business as a way of life’ and who take ‘satisfaction (profit apart) in 
constructing a factory, a railway, a mine or a farm’ (Keynes 1936: 150).7 He also 
makes explicit in these passages that, without animal spirits, investment will be 
inadequate and the economy will settle into a slump. As the key element in the 
investment decision, therefore, animal spirits were central to Keynes’s theory of 
effective demand and his identification of an underemployment equilibrium as the 
norm.8  
 The reason that the investment decision relies on animal spirits is that 
rational quantitative calculation alone cannot justify action under uncertainty. 
This argument, building on Keynes’s Treatise on Probability, provides the basis 
for the broader interpretation of animal spirits in the Post Keynesian literature, 
one captured by Kregel (1987) in the term ‘rational spirits’.9 Keynes understood 
the economy as an open, organic system, where creativity and evolutionary 
change meant that the past was only a limited guide to the future. Creative 
behaviour and social structures change in ways which cannot be predicted on the 
basis of quantified probabilities. Far from being predictable, the future has yet to 
be created (Shackle 1972). In such an environment, which is in general 
characterised by uncertainty, reason and evidence can only provide a partial 
justification for decisions. Institutions and social practices evolve to provide a 
more stable environment for decision-making. But reason and evidence need to be 
supplemented by other sources of (uncertain) knowledge: conventional 
knowledge, the knowledge of experts and reliance on past experience (Keynes 
1937). Combining these disparate sources of knowledge requires the exercise of 
judgment.10 Indeed, in Keynes’s framework behaviour which ignores the 
limitations on calculative rationality would itself be irrational (Kregel 1987). But, 
given that judgement has recourse to more or less evidence and reason in different 
circumstances, the mainstream duality of rationality/irrationality no longer applies 
(or else most judgement must be classed as irrational).  
 Both Keynes (1921) and Knight (1921) drew a strong distinction between 
expectations themselves and the degree of confidence with which they are held. 
Confidence depends partly on weight of argument. Weight is greater the larger the 
amount of relevant knowledge relative to relevant ignorance. But more evidence 
and greater weight may be associated with an outcome being more or less likely. 
Further, more evidence may be associated with reduced weight if it reveals new 
                                                 
7 The idea was current in the 1930s when Keynes was writing that entrepreneurs displayed 
particular characteristics (see Matthews 1984). 
8Pace Barens (2011), who sees animal spirits as only relevant to short-run fluctuations rather than 
underemployment equilibrium.  
9 Keynes’s argument that action requires an emotional trigger has been developed in neuroscience, 
notably be Bechara and Damasio (2005); see further Dow (2011). 
10 See Bhidé (2011) for a discussion of the central role for judgement where knowledge is 
uncertain, applied to theorising as well as to financial market analysis. 
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 realms of ignorance. But the degree to which ignorance is recognised is ultimately 
a matter of psychology (Dow 1995); indeed Keynes (1936: 149) refers to the 
importance of ‘business psychology’ for the state of confidence. Since weight 
itself is indeterminate, given that it may shift with changing judgements as to new 
evidence and new ideas about relevance, confidence is also indeterminate and 
subject to shifts. But since decisions on investment in particular are dependent on 
such judgements (far less animal spirits), macroeconomic outcomes are 
indeterminate. This is the open, organic world which makes quantitative 
probabilities an inappropriate basis for knowledge (Kregel 1987).  
 This was a general theory of knowledge, as Keynes (1936: 162-3) 
indicates, following the passages cited above on animal spirits: 
 
[H]uman decisions affecting the future, whether personal or political or 
economic, cannot depend on strict mathematical expectation, since the basis 
for making such calculations does not exist; … it is our innate urge to activity 
which makes the wheels go round, our rational selves choosing between the 
alternatives as best we are able, calculating where we can, but often falling 
back for our motive on whim or sentiment or chance. 
 
 Since Keynes’s theory of knowledge is general (in building on the 
generality of uncertainty), the role of animal spirits is potentially also general, 
where conventional judgement and routine behaviour alone are not sufficient to 
promote action, given the uncertainty surrounding reason and evidence.11 All 
activity potentially requires some element of animal spirits.12 But Keynes’s 
analysis indicates that the relative importance of animal spirits as an innate 
disposition is greater in some circumstances than others, which is why he focused 
the discussion on entrepreneurial action. For example he argued that conventional 
judgement was relatively more important than animal spirits in the financial 
sector.  
 Keynes’s use of the concept of animal spirits therefore goes beyond a 
relatively enduring characteristic of entrepreneurs alone and incorporates his 
notion that ‘spontaneous optimism’ may ‘falter’. Therefore, in addition to animal 
spirits being an innate characteristic whose incidence may change over the long 
term with changes in industrial organisation, they are also a contributor to 
                                                 
11 Coddington (1982) correctly identified the general rationale for the role of animal spirits as 
applying potentially to all decision making. But his conclusion was that, if all decision-making 
were indeterminate as a result of exogenous influences on expectations, then macroeconomics 
would collapse into nihilism.  
12 Getting up in the morning in spite of our inability to quantify probabilistic forecasts for the day 
is something normally governed by routine as much as reason and experience; but sometimes our 
animal spirits may fail, leading us to take ‘duvet days’. 
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 decision-making which may vary in the short term – they may be ‘dimmed’. 
(While uncertainty is greatest for long-term expectations, it also applies to short-
term expectations; both can vary in the short run.) Thus an increase in uncertainty 
because of a reduction in confidence in expectations discourages active 
decisions.13 Just as the degree of confidence can change by degrees, animal spirits 
can also be understood to change by degrees. Thus, while the application to the 
investment decision treated action and inaction as binary concepts (as in Shackle’s 
‘crucial experiments’), the broader application of animal spirits would allow for 
degrees of action, ranging from a preference to remain liquid, through following 
conventional judgement in varying degrees, to pure creative innovation.  
 Dequech (1999) shows how animal spirits influence both expectations and 
confidence, demonstrating that animal spirits are interrelated with cognition. He 
offers an overarching definition of the meaning of animal spirits as ‘the optimistic 
disposition to face uncertainty’ (Dequech 1999: 420, n.12). As far as expectations 
are concerned, strong animal spirits take the form of spontaneous optimism, i.e. 
optimism which does not logically follow from reason and evidence. As far as the 
confidence in expectations is concerned, strong animal spirits take two forms: a 
low perception of uncertainty on the one hand and a high willingness to act in 
spite of whatever uncertainty is perceived on the other hand.14 But they are also 
subject to variation depending on circumstances. This implies that we may 
explore the structural factors which give more rein to entrepreneurship and thus to 
animal spirits separately from the circumstances which tend to change the strength 
of animal spirits. 
 Dequech includes creativity as a variable which enters separately into 
expectations formation and indeed as a factor in making the economic 
environment so uncertain. Then animal spirits determine how far innovative 
action actually occurs. Terzi (1999: 16-7) draws a parallel between animal spirits 
and Schumpeter’s urge to innovate.15 But these urges can arguably be understood 
as goals, while animal spirits refer more to the epistemology applied to the 
motivation: the degree of optimism and the attitude to uncertainty, the urge to 
action in spite of uncertainty. This relates to discussion about process rather than 
                                                 
13 The obverse is an increase in liquidity preference (Kregel 1987). In the Post Keynesian literature 
liquidity preference is a concept which has also been generalised to apply to all decisions (to 
spend, to invest, to seek employment, etc), not just the choice between money and bonds (Dow 
and Dow 1989). 
14 See further Dequech (2005); see Dow (1995) on uncertainty perception and weight of argument. 
15 Schumpeter, like Keynes, depicted entrepreneurs as pro-active in innovation, going beyond 
rationality in taking steps for which the outcome was uncertain (Hagedoorn 1996). However 
Loasby (1999: ch. 8) argues that Schumpeter nevertheless identified entrepreneurs as being 
relatively skilled in making predictions under uncertainty; they suffer from lower levels of 
uncertainty than others. This differs from Keynes’s focus on optimism and willingness both to 
recognise and to face up to uncertainty. 
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 ends, about activity for its own sake, about channelling energies (Matthews 1984) 
and about Nietzschian ‘becoming’ and ‘overcoming’.16 Thus motivations to 
innovate may refer to more fundamental motivations, such as personal satisfaction 
or financial accumulation, and/or to a drive which is not goal-related, such as 
‘becoming’. As Bhidé (2011: 5) puts it: ‘Unfathomable emotions and 
subconscious drives, not just the pursuit of wealth (or the possibility of 
pleasurable consumption that wealth provides), play a crucial role in determining 
whether someone makes a “leap in the dark”’. 
 Since the literature on innovation places such importance on 
epistemological issues arising from the inherent uncertainty surrounding the 
innovation process, it seems that there is significant scope for considering 
innovation as a particular action to which animal spirits are relevant. Indeed there 
have been increasing attempts to combine Schumpeterian theory and Keynesian 
theory (see for example Bertocco 2007) which suggest that there may be some 
common ground to be explored. Most importantly for our purposes, Schumpeter’s 
PhD student Minsky applied Schumpeterian theory of innovation to the financial 
sector in his Keynesian theory of financial instability in a way which we will 
explore below as we consider animal spirits in that sector.  
 We have already noted that animal spirits may be more evident and more 
important in some circumstances than others: where there is particular uncertainty 
and where action goes beyond routine and convention. In considering animal 
spirits for policy we therefore need to consider where the important incidence of 
animal spirits is in the modern economy. Keynes (1921) analysed expectations (or 
in his terms probability) as being objective in the sense of drawing on reason and 
experience; faced with the same experience, different analysts or decision makers 
applying reason would reach the same conclusions. But different analysts and 
decision makers do not build on the same experience; their contexts are different 
such that even what are often regarded as ‘facts’ may be understood differently 
and in particular uncertainty may be perceived differently. But in any case, once 
we take account of the role of conventional judgement and animal spirits being 
combined with reason and experience, the context-specificity and individual 
particularity of expectations becomes apparent (Shackle 1974; Kregel 1987). As 
Carabelli (1988: 237) puts it: ‘What he [Keynes] appeared to think was that 
different types of rationality, or rules of reasonableness, existed, according to the 
different cognitives [sic] domains, which characterised the different economic 
groups’. Since animal spirits enter into the perception of uncertainty surrounding 
knowledge, they affect the process of judgement (Davis 2003). Keynes (1936: 
162) indicated with respect to animal spirits that ‘we should not conclude … that 
everything depends on waves of irrational psychology’. 
                                                 
16 Robb (2009) explains Nietzsche’s thought, relative to rationalist logic applied to given ends in 
the absence of uncertainty (see also Bhidé 2011: 5). 
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  While animal spirits play a general part in addressing the uncertainty 
surrounding our knowledge, there is scope for disaggregating their nature and role 
according to different functional groupings in the economy, as well as to different 
times and places (see further Gerrard 2003). This applies to spontaneous optimism 
and the willingness to ignore and perceive uncertainty as an enduring 
characteristic on the one hand and as something which varies conjuncturally on 
the other. Animal spirits are therefore endogenous to structural change and also to 
changing conjuncture. But they are also related to the (uncertain) knowledge on 
which decisions are based, in that the confidence with which expectations are held 
depends on the propensity to recognise uncertainty. Just as cognition and emotion 
are interconnected, so are animal spirits and the other inputs to decision-making. 
In particular, conventions and routines are a way of avoiding uncertainty in a 
passive way, while the exercise of animal spirits is avoidance in an active way. In 
what follows we will therefore also explore the interactions between animal spirits 
and other contributors to decision-making. 
 We begin by focusing on the non-financial business sector as the primary 
arena for animal spirits. But then we see that animal spirits feature in other 
sectors, and indeed can contribute to our understanding of behaviour in the 
financial sector in the run-up to the current crisis. We will consider animal spirits 
in terms of structural factors which change only slowly, but also animal spirits 
whose variability in times of high uncertainty plays an important part in short-
term developments. 
 
Extending Animal Spirits within a Post Keynesian Framework 
 
Business sector – non-financial 
 
The role of entrepreneurship and thus the scope for animal spirits has changed 
with structural change in the production sector; Keynes noted that the relative 
decline of owner-managership of companies meant a reduced incidence of the 
business way of life (Gerrard 1994: 16). But he focused his analysis of capital 
investment on entrepreneurs as individual owner-mangers and on the increasing 
role of financial markets in overriding entrepreneurial behaviour and thus animal 
spirits (Keynes 1936: ch. 12). This followed from the increasing dependence of 
companies on finance by raising share capital, as companies changed from owner-
managership to being publicly-quoted companies. The valuations of investment 
plans by financial markets therefore put constraints on entrepreneurial activity 
even by large companies. Keynes contrasted the role of the animal spirits of 
entrepreneurs taking the long view with the strongly socio-conventional nature of 
market behaviour taking the short view where uncertainty had less scope.  
10
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  Individual owner-managership continues to be relevant to small firms. 
Indeed the persistent evidence of high failure rates among start-ups is evidence 
itself of the persistence of strong animal spirits in defiance of the lack of purely 
rational justification for capital investment. Nevertheless the driving force for 
investment has increasingly become large business organisations. But Schumpeter 
(1943) carried the character of entrepreneurship over into routine cooperative 
behaviour within even the large joint-stock companies which came to dominate 
entrepreneurial activity in the twentieth century (see further Langlois 1996). He 
saw research and development (R&D) activity building on a larger evidence base 
than was available to small owner-managed firms, and thus apparently a reduced 
need for animal spirits. But others have emphasised nevertheless that uncertainty 
still prevails for large companies, by implication maintaining the role of animal 
spirits (see e.g. Loasby 1999: ch.8). 
 The traditional theory of enterprise, which focused on the individual 
entrepreneur as directing the firm, enabled a profit-maximisation modelling 
approach to be more readily applied. But Nelson and Winter’s (1982) 
evolutionary approach places the role of individuals and their animal spirits within 
organisations, whose structure is important for outcomes. They emphasise the 
importance of routines in large organisations as part of an evolutionary process 
which influences the path of technological change. In accordance with this 
approach, Earl and Potts (2011) have developed an insightful line of argument 
focusing on the internal structure of organisations.17 They demonstrate that the 
conflict which Keynes had identified between the short-term calculations of 
financial markets and the long-term plans of entrepreneurs is now increasingly 
playing out within organisations in the internal relations between the accounting 
function and the R&D function. Where the accounting function is given 
precedence, the animal spirits of the R&D function are suppressed.  
 This emphasis on short-term valuations has acquired even greater force 
through the increasing practice of remuneration by stock options, skewing 
incentives away from innovation (Lazonick 2009). Indeed changing industrial 
organisation also changes the moral dimension of choice (Loasby 1976: 6). 
Morality is a peculiarly human aspect of ‘animal’ spirits. In a public company, 
managers have a moral responsibility to pursue the interests of shareholders and 
thus avoid undue risk. Yet the loss of moral sensibility in business behaviour has 
become a running feature of public discourse, particularly regarding the financial 
sector.  
 Where market valuations are the primary focus, there is a tendency to 
consider mergers and acquisitions (M&A) as an alternative to innovation as a 
means of enhancing stock value. This in itself requires the exercise of animal 
                                                 
17 This paper was particularly influential for our thinking. 
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 spirits, given the inevitable uncertainty surrounding the long-term value of assets 
being acquired, but with different consequences to animal-spirits-driven 
innovation. For Keynes animal spirits were seen in a positive light, as 
underpinning investment, contrary to their negative interpretation in the 
mainstream literature as a source of disturbance (Koppl 1991, Barens 2011). But 
here we see the possibility of the negative consequences of animal spirits for 
capital investment if they are diverted into other activities. Takeovers can have a 
range of positive consequences for productivity and for aggregate demand, 
particularly if they are cross-border; they can generate fee income and increased 
employment. But both the aggregate supply and aggregate demand consequences 
will often be negative.18 
 Marchionatti (1999) extends our understanding of animal spirits in another 
direction by drawing on Marshallian and Schumpeterian ideas about the business 
environment. We have already seen that Schumpeterian analysis shows that the 
structure of industrial organisation (firm size, firm age, corporate governance etc.) 
is important for the scope and character of animal spirits, just as Marshall had 
focused on the importance of industrial organisation for entrepreneurship. The 
success of the industrial districts which Marshall advocated as a successful form 
of organisation was due in large part to a factor on which both Keynes and 
Schumpeter focussed: the political, social and economic atmosphere. In 
discussing the relevance of atmosphere for animal spirits, Marchionatti (1999: 
431) identifies it with the ‘rules of the social game’, based on a shared ideology or 
‘mental model’. Marshall’s industrial districts allow a productive atmosphere for 
innovation as a positive externality. A positive atmosphere can promote 
innovation by encouraging spontaneous optimism, i.e. optimism not justified by 
rationalist logic. It can also discourage a focus on the uncertainties of knowledge. 
A negative atmosphere on the other hand can discourage innovation by breeding 
spontaneous pessimism, increased awareness of uncertainty and increased 
uncertainty aversion. 
 There is an inherent social dimension to the atmosphere which imbues 
animal spirits. While much of the discussion of animal spirits treats them as an 
individualistic phenomenon, Dequech (1999) notes the role of social 
conditioning.19 Indeed one of the early references to self-fulfilling expectations on 
which the mainstream literature draws (see e.g. Farmer and Guo 1994) is the 
sociologist Merton’s (1948) introduction of the concept in terms of ‘social logic’. 
While the literature on entrepreneurship encourages an individualistic 
understanding of animal spirits, even in that context individuals draw on the social 
atmosphere to which Keynes refers. Thus, for example, the emotional state, and 
                                                 
18 See Earl (1984: 181-3) for an analysis of different types of M&A activity. 
19 See also Gillies (2003) on the intersubjectivity of long-term expectations. 
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 therefore animal spirits, within a firm may be encouraged by effective leadership 
(see Wallis, Dollery and Crase 2009).    
 The notion of ‘atmosphere’ is not only a product of structure, but it is also 
important for the behaviour of animal spirits in the short run, since changes in the 
atmosphere may discourage innovative ‘leaps in the dark’. This may result, as 
Keynes (1936: 162) pointed out, in a change in the political atmosphere, which 
may cause animal spirits to falter: 
 
[E]conomic prosperity is excessively dependent on a political and social 
atmosphere which is congenial to the average business man. If the fear of 
a Labour Government or a New Deal depresses enterprise, this need not be 
the result either of a reasonable calculation or of a plot with political 
intent; — it is the mere consequence of upsetting the delicate balance of 
spontaneous optimism. In estimating the prospects of investment, we must 
have regard, therefore, to the nerves and hysteria and even the digestions 
and reactions to the weather of those upon whose spontaneous activity it 
largely depends. 
 
We will pick up again on issues of industrial structure and animal spirits and of 
the political and social atmosphere in the discussion of policy below. But before 
then we turn to the consideration of animal spirits in a context where Keynes, 
writing in the 1930s, thought they were less relevant: the financial sector, and, in 
particular, banking. 
 
Financial sector 
 
Keynes focused his attention in discussing animal spirits on entrepreneurial 
investment as being the activity most concerned with acting on highly uncertain 
long-term expectations, while the financial sector was driven much more by 
routine behaviour and conventional judgement. But the financial sector, and 
particularly banking, has undergone major structural change since the 1930s. 
Indeed one of Minsky’s (1986) major contributions was to apply Schumpeterian 
theory of innovation to the financial sector (see Papadimitriou and Wray 2010). 
Thus Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis focuses on the financial 
innovations resulting from the forces of competition and attempts to avoid the 
costs of regulatory constraints — which create an increasingly fragile financial 
structure. These are not innovations which centrally involve capital investment 
and employment, but rather focus on new financial products, practices and 
organisational forms in companies and markets. As long as each innovation 
becomes widely adopted and as regulation evolves to take them into account, the 
impetus for further innovation remains.  
13
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  Minsky’s analysis is very apt for understanding the banking crisis which 
broke in 2007. Deregulation had opened up markets to previously-segmented 
financial institutions, creating possibilities for a new structure for the financial 
sector and new products and practices. But the introduction of capital adequacy 
ratios in 1988 under the Basel I system prompted banks in particular to strip assets 
off their balance sheets by means of securitisation and to engage in a range of 
non-traditional activities such as derivatives trading rather than lending, all to 
avoid raising capital (see Chick 1986, 2008). While banks could be said 
traditionally to have exercised some animal spirits when engaging in loan 
contracts held to their full term, the emergence of the originate-and-distribute 
model reduced uncertainty and thus the need for animal spirits. The increasing 
complexity and opacity of structured derivatives products based on originate-and-
distribute credit (particularly for subprime mortgages) was a major factor in the 
build-up of the crisis. Another structural factor was the increasing incidence of 
M&A activity in banking which had followed on deregulation, as an alternative to 
in-house innovation.20  
 How far did animal spirits play a part in these structural developments? 
Since the 1960s banks have been pro-active in competition, driving innovation 
within the sector. It is in the nature of innovation in a highly competitive 
environment that its outcome cannot be predicted in any precise way, i.e. it is 
subject to high uncertainty. While, as with real production, innovation may 
become routinised to a considerable extent, nevertheless the exercise of animal 
spirits is required in choosing one innovative path over another, and choosing the 
timing and mode of delivery of particular products. This is most clear in the case 
of takeovers. For example the Royal Bank of Scotland’s takeover of ABN-Amro 
can be seen as a case of spontaneous optimism (optimism which could not be 
fully explained either by rational calculation or by conventional judgement) and 
an unwillingness to address the uncertainty surrounding this judgement, i.e. a case 
of strong animal spirits.  
 We would argue therefore that animal spirits are relevant to an analysis of 
structural innovation in modern banking, with many parallels to an analysis of 
animal spirits and innovation in the productive sector. We should also consider 
the financial sector more widely and in particular the kind of market sentiment 
which is central to a Keynesian and Minskyan account of financial markets. 
Market valuations draw on reason and evidence as far as possible, but they rely 
                                                 
20 Indeed the Royal Bank of Scotland’s takeover of ABN-Amro was seen as a major factor in its 
downfall in the crisis. M&A within the UK had been spurred on particularly by new legislation 
which allowed the demutualisation of building societies and savings banks, which then found it 
hard to compete with the large established banks. It was the innovative choice by one of these new 
banks, Northern Rock, to rely so extensively on interbank funding which led to its downfall.  
 
14
Submission to Capitalism and Society
http://www.bepress.com/cas
 heavily also on conventional judgement (Dow 2010). Where action in line with 
conventional judgement becomes routinised, there is not much of a gap to be 
filled by animal spirits. But some market commentators have referred to the 
strengthening of market sentiment before the crisis in terms of animal spirits. 
Market sentiment was characterised by optimism which was not justified by 
reason and evidence alone. Also there was little evidence of awareness of the 
uncertainty surrounding market valuations. Financial markets are notoriously 
averse to uncertainty, but little was perceived. So far financial markets seem to fit 
Dequech’s definition of animal spirits. But since this attitude became entrenched 
as a conventional judgement it fits less well. Market behaviour based on 
overoptimistic expectations believed to be close to certain (or at least certain 
within a known probability distribution) became routine, not appearing to require 
much in the way of spontaneous urges.  
 Yet psychological theory applied to the financial crisis (emotional finance 
theory) does support the notion of subconscious urges among traders (Tuckett 
2011). Indeed market sentiment as conventional judgement may be said to draw 
on animal spirits in the form of absorption of atmosphere, where atmosphere 
cannot be reduced to rationality. Keynes’s concern with the political and social 
atmosphere as supporting ‘the delicate balance of spontaneous optimism’ for ‘the 
average business man’ is relevant to the delicate balance of conventional 
optimism in financial markets. When that balance is upset – by a freezing of the 
interbank market, by the failure of a large financial institution, or by the size of 
the public deficit – the primary effect on markets is to draw attention to 
uncertainty, to which markets are highly averse. On both counts (uncertainty 
perception and uncertainty aversion) animal spirits are dimmed. This sets in train 
asset sales which depress market values; falling values cause defaults in a highly-
leveraged and interconnected system, and the basis for optimism (as distinct from 
spontaneous optimism) dies.  
 This discussion of animal spirits and the financial sector indicates that we 
should include the financial sector along with the productive sector in discussion 
of the policy relevance of animal spirits. 
 
Conclusion: Animal Spirits and Policy  
 
We have attempted here to clarify the various meanings given to animal spirits 
with a view to considering their policy relevance. The traditional mainstream 
view of animal spirits is that they are irrational and thus an unwelcome source of 
stochastic disturbance. Like any other stochastic disturbance, the policy 
implications are very limited. Accepting this distinction between rationality and 
irrationality, Akerlof and Shiller (2009) explore animal spirits further in terms of 
irrationality and non-economic motivation. In this paper we explored the Post 
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 Keynesian understanding of animal spirits based on a broader understanding of 
rationality which stems from an understanding of the pervasiveness of 
uncertainty. We explored animal spirits as ‘the optimistic disposition to face 
uncertainty’ (Dequech 1999: 420, n.12) both as an enduring disposition most 
evident among entrepreneurs on the one hand and on the other hand as something 
which advances and recedes in the short run.  
 Because animal spirits combine with knowledge of different forms as the 
basis for action, and have a strong social dimension, and because innovation 
occurs primarily now in large organisations, animal spirits take on a different hue 
from the traditional individualistic view of them as ‘mere caprice’. These factors 
also open up the opportunity for policy to be addressed to animal spirits; this is 
important since animal spirits are key to innovation in the production sector as a 
long-run phenomenon and to emergence from recessions in the shorter term. Thus 
policy can be addressed to improving the institutional and cultural environment 
for innovation, providing government support for investment when animal spirits 
are weak and addressing the economic, political and social atmosphere.  
 While Keynes had limited his discussion of animal spirits to the 
production sector rather than the financial sector, here we have shown that 
analysis in terms of animal spirits can contribute to our understanding of the 
financial crisis. The evolutionary analysis of structures, products and practices 
carries over from the production sector to the financial sector. We saw the 
increasing incentives in the production sector to divert activity from capital 
investment to M&A as a less socially-desirable consequence of the exercise of 
animal spirits. In the financial sector we saw even more scope for socially-
undesirable consequences of animal spirits. Since provision of a stable banking 
system which creates stable money is a necessary contributor to a productive 
economy, policy should be addressed to reformulating regulation to structure 
banking in such a way as to curtail the scope for the more damaging exercise of 
animal spirits. 
 We have seen that the long-term consequences of animal spirits are 
relevant for policy with respect to two important areas: economic growth through 
innovation and the maintenance of a stable financial sector which meets the needs 
of the production sector. There is room for government to tip the balance back 
towards animal spirits which promote business innovation. This is generally 
recognised for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) which are dependent 
on bank finance. Provision of finance is discouraged by evidence of failure rates 
among new small business in particular. But traditional banking involved close 
relationships with borrowers such that enough information could be gathered 
about potential borrowers on which to base a judgement by the bank (see further 
Bhidé 2010). Essentially it required the bank to share the animal spirits of the 
borrower, but to a lesser degree given the mechanisms available for protecting the 
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 bank’s position (such as collateral requirements). The current policy to require 
banks to lend more to small businesses can only be justified for the banks if they 
change their practices back in the direction of traditional relationship banking.  
 For larger scale business in strategic sectors the policy issue is rather 
different. A case can be made for restoring the policy of identifying key sectors 
for support; this would apply particularly to sectors, such as the airline industry, 
which require such extensive long-range planning as to exceed any reasonable 
exercise of animal spirits. It would be impossible for the private sector not to 
perceive the uncertainty surrounding innovation in that sector and unreasonable 
then to ignore it; animal spirits could not be expected to counteract the 
tremendous uncertainties involved. Animal spirits are a key distinguishing feature 
of enterprise relative to government. But when they are lacking and government 
can see the social consequences of this, either the government can provide support 
to provide good reason for investment, or indeed public sector investment can 
effectively substitute for enterprise.  
 Equally important as attention to individual firms or sectors is the 
economic, political and social atmosphere as a longstanding phenomenon. Just as 
firms are social structures, they are embedded in society more widely. Indeed a 
neo-Schumpeterian national innovation system builds on the premise that 
innovation is a systemic process. Therefore, as Nelson has argued, policy can, and 
needs to, be directed also to culture and institutions at the national level (see 
Nelson, ed., 1993). These institutions include the financial sector, both as provider 
of finance and as provider of a stable means of payment, on which animal spirits 
depend.  
 Animal spirits may also vary in the short run, causing either (or both) 
financial market instability or unwillingness of firms to engage in capital 
investment. There is scope for policy to address both of these. Government 
pronouncements can influence the day-to-day atmosphere, changing the state of 
spontaneous optimism and the attitude to uncertainty. Keynes had seen interest 
rate policy in this light (Tily 2007: ch. 11) and there has been increasing attention 
recently to the importance of central bank signalling (Dow, Klaes and Montagnoli 
2007). Thus the authorities can use pronouncements in an effort to stabilise 
financial markets, as well as to encourage capital investment.  
 But signalling can only be successful if it is not overwhelmingly 
contradicted by experience. The theory of animal spirits we have been exploring 
here has considered animal spirits as being integrated with a general theory of 
knowledge as the basis for action. They therefore need to be considered alongside 
reason, evidence and conventional judgement as a necessary impetus for non-
routine action. Strong animal spirits can allow us to ignore uncertainty and even 
reason and evidence (Tuckett 2011). But it is a matter of balance. If animal spirits 
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 are strong at a time when reason and evidence do not support them, at some point 
reason and evidence break through.  
 Animal spirits are in the subconscious, neither random nor subject to full 
explanation; they are neither rational nor irrational, but rather arational. Yet we 
have identified contributors to animal spirits, such as the economic, political and 
social atmosphere. This is open to analysis and potentially to management by 
government. Animal spirits are only a part, but an integrated part, of the 
foundations for action.      
 
 
References 
 
Akerlof, G A and Shiller, R J (2009) Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology 
Drives the Economy, and Why it Matters for Global Capitalism. Princeton 
NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Azariadis, C (1981) ‘Self-fulfilling Prophecies’, Journal of Economic Theory 25: 
380-96. 
 
Barens, I (2011) ‘“Animal Sprits” in John Maynard Keynes’s General Theory of 
Employment, Interest and Money’, Darmstadt University of Technology 
Discussion Papers in Economics, no. 201. 
 
Bechara, A and Damasio, A R (2005) ‘The somatic marker hypothesis: A neural 
theory of economic decision’, Games and Economic Behavior 52: 336–72. 
 
Bertocco, G (2007) ‘The Characteristics of a Monetary Economy: a Keynes-
Schumpeter approach’, Cambridge Journal of Economics 31(1): 101-22. 
 
Bhidé, A (2011) A Call for Judgment: Sensible Finance for a Dynamic Economy. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Carabelli, A (1988) On Keynes’s Method. London: Macmillan. 
 
Chick, V (1986) ‘The Evolution of the Banking System and the Theory of Saving, 
Investment and Interest’, Economies et Sociétés, série Monnaie et 
Production no. 3, 111-26, reprinted in P Arestis and S C Dow (eds) On 
Money, Method and Keynes. London: Macmillan, 1992. 
 
18
Submission to Capitalism and Society
http://www.bepress.com/cas
 Chick, V (2008) ‘Could the Crisis at Northern Rock have been Predicted?: An 
Evolutionary Approach’, Contributions to Political Economy 27(1): 115-
24. 
 
Coddington, A (1982) ‘Deficient Foresight: A Troublesome Theme in Keynesian 
Economics’, American Economic Review 72 (3): 480-7. 
 
Davidson, P (2007) John Maynard Keynes. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Davis, J B (1999) ‘Common sense: a middle way between formalism and post-
structuralism?, Cambridge Journal of Economics 23(4): 503-15. 
 
Davis, J B (2003) ‘The relationship between Keynes’s earlier and later thinking’, 
in J Runde and S Mizuhara (eds), The Philosophy of Keynes’s Economics: 
Probability, Uncertainty and Convention. London: Routledge. 
 
De Grauwe, (2010) ‘Animal Spirits and Monetary Policy’, Economic Theory, DOI 
10.1007/s00199-010-0543-0. 
 
Dequech D. (1999) ‘Expectations and confidence under uncertainty’, Journal of 
Post Keynesian Economics 21(3): 415-30. 
 
Dequech, D (2005) ‘Confidence and Alternative Keynesian Methods of Asset 
Choice’, Review of Political Economy 17(4): 533-47. 
 
Dow, A and Dow, S (1985) ‘Animal Spirits and Rationality’, in T Lawson and H 
Pesaran (eds), Keynes' Economics:  Methodological Issues, Croom Helm. 
 
Dow, A and Dow, S (1989) ‘Endogenous Money Creation and Idle Balances’, in J 
Pheby (ed.), New Directions in Post Keynesian Economics. Aldershot: 
Edward Elgar. 
 
Dow, S C (1995) ‘Uncertainty about Uncertainty’, in S C Dow and J Hillard (eds), 
Keynes, Knowledge and Uncertainty. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
Dow, S C (2010) ‘Keynes on Knowledge, Expectations and Rationality’, 
presented to the Center on Capitalism and Society Conference on 
Microfoundations for Modern Macroeconomics, New York 19-20 
November. 
 
19
Dow and Dow: Animal Spirits Revisited
 Dow, S C (2011) ‘Cognition, Sentiment and Financial Instability: Psychology in a 
Minsky Framework’, Cambridge Journal of Economics 35(2): 233-50. 
 
Dow, S C, Klaes, M and Montagnoli, A (2007) ‘Monetary Policy by Signal’, in D 
G Mayes and J Toporowski (eds), Open Market Operations and the 
Financial Markets. London: Routledge. 
 
Earl, P E (1984) The Corporate Imagination: how big companies make mistakes. 
Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe and Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books. 
 
Earl, P and Potts, J (2011) ‘Grand Designs versus Bean Counting: Creative Cycles 
in Firms’, http://shredecon.wordpress.com/. 
 
Farmer, R E A (2010) ‘Animal Spirits, Persistent Unemployment and the Belief 
Function’, NBER Working Paper no. 16522. 
 
Farmer, R E A and Guo, J-T (1994) ‘Real Business Cycles and the Animal Spirits 
Hypothesis’, Journal of Economic Theory 63: 42-72. 
 
Frydman, R and Goldberg, M D (2011) Beyond Mechanical Markets: Asset Price 
Swings, Risk, and the Role of the State. Princeton NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
 
Gerrard, B (1994) ‘Animal Spirits’, in P Arestis and M Sawyer (eds), The Elgar 
Companion to Radical Political Economy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
Gerrard, B (2003) ‘Keynesian uncertainty: what do we know?’, in J Runde and S 
Mizuhara (eds), The Philosophy of Keynes’s Economics: Probability, 
Uncertainty and Convention. London: Routledge. 
 
Gillies, D (2003) ‘Probability and uncertainty in Keynes’s The General Theory’, 
in J Runde and S Mizuhara (eds), The Philosophy of Keynes’s Economics: 
Probability, Uncertainty and Convention. London: Routledge. 
 
Hagedoorn, J (1996) ‘Innovation and Entrepreneurship: Schumpeter Revisited’, 
Industrial and Corporate Change 5(3): 883-96. 
 
Howitt, P and McAfee, R P (1992) ‘Animal Spirits’, American Economic Review 
82(3): 491-507. 
 
Keynes, J M (1921) A Treatise on Probability. London: Macmillan. 
20
Submission to Capitalism and Society
http://www.bepress.com/cas
 Keynes, J M (1936) The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. 
London: Macmillan.  
 
Keynes, J M (1937) ‘The General Theory of Employment’, reprinted in The 
General Theory and After Part II: Defence and Development, Collected 
Writings Vol. XIV. London: Macmillan, for the Royal Economic Society, 
1973. 
 
Knight, F (1921) Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit. New York: Harper. 
 
Koppl, R (1991) ‘Retrospectives: Animal Spirits’, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 5(3): 203-10. 
 
Kregel, J A (1987) ‘Rational Spirits and The Post Keynesian Macrotheory of 
Micro Economics’, de Economist 135(4): 519-31.  
 
Langlois, R N (1996) ‘Schumpeter and Personal Capitalism’, University of 
Connecticut Economics Working Papers no. 199605. 
 
Lazonick, W (2009) ‘The New Economy Business Model and the Crisis of U.S. 
Capitalism’, Capitalism and Society 4 (2), article 4. 
 
Loasby, B J (1976) Choice, Complexity and Ignorance. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Loasby, B J (1999) Knowledge, Institutions and Evolution in Economics: The 
Graz Schumperter Lectures. London: Routledge. 
 
Marchionatti, R (1999) ‘On Keynes’s Animal Spirits’, Kyklos 52: 415-39. 
 
Matthews, R C O (1984) ‘Animal Spirits’, Proceedings of the British Academy, 
70: 209-29. 
 
Merton, R K (1948) ‘The Self-fulfilling Prophecy’, Antioch Review 8: 193-210. 
 
Minsky, H P (1986) Stabilizing an Unstable Economy. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
 
Moggridge, D (1992) ‘The Source of Animal Spirits’, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 6(3): 207-9.  
 
21
Dow and Dow: Animal Spirits Revisited
 Nelson, R R (ed.) (1993) National Innovation Systems: a comparative analysis. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Nelson, R R and Winter, S G (1982) An Evolutionary Theory of Economic 
Change. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Nuti, D M (2009) ‘Akerlof and Shiller, Animal Spirits: A Misnomer for their 
Sound Economics’, Short Notes no, 1, Department of Economics, 
University of Rome “La Sapienza”. 
 
Papadimitriou, D B and Wray, L R (2010) ‘Introduction: Minsky on money, 
banking and finance’, in D B Papadimitriou and L R Wray (eds), The 
Elgar Companion to Hyman Minsky. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
Robb, R (2009) ‘Nietzsche and the Economics of Becoming’, Capitalism and 
Society 4(1), article 3. 
 
Schumpeter, J (1943) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London: Allen and 
Unwin. 
 
Sent, E.-M. (2004) ‘Behavioural Economics: How Psychology Made Its (Limited) 
Way Back into Economics’, History of Political Economy, 36(4): 735-60. 
 
Shackle, G L S (1972) Epistemics & Economics: A Critique of Economic 
Doctrines. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Shackle, G L S (1974) ‘Decision: The Human Predicament’, The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 412. 
 
Shleifer, A (1986) ‘Implementation Cycles’, Journal of Political Economy 94(6): 
1163-90. 
 
Terzi, A (1999) ‘Animal Spirits’, in P A O’Hara (ed.), Encyclopedia of Political 
Economy. London: Routledge. 
 
Tily, G (2007) Keynes’s General Theory, the Rate of Interest and ‘Keynesian’ 
Economics: Keynes Betrayed. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Tuckett, D (2011) Minding the Markets: An Emotional Finance View of Financial 
Instability. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
22
Submission to Capitalism and Society
http://www.bepress.com/cas
 Wallis, J, Dollery, B and Crase, L (2009) ‘Political Economy and Organizational 
Leadership: A Hope-based Theory’, Review of Political Economy 21: 123-
43. 
 
Woodford, M (1991) ‘Self-fulfilling expectations and fluctuations in aggregate 
demand’, in N G Mankiw and D Romer (eds), New Keynesian Economics 
vol 2. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
23
Dow and Dow: Animal Spirits Revisited
